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APPLICATION OF THE UAAA, RUAAA, AND
STATE ATHLETE-AGENT LAWS TO
CORRUPTION IN MEN’S COLLEGE
BASKETBALL AND REVISIONS
NECESSITATED BY NCAA RULE CHANGES
JOSHUA LENS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Opening statements in the October 2018 federal trial regarding corruption
in men’s college basketball served as a juicy appetizer for what was to come in
the rest of the trial. Now former Adidas executive James Gatto, former Adidas
consultant Merl Code, and aspiring agent and former runner for NBA agent
Andy Miller, Christian Dawkins, faced accusations that they paid money from
Adidas to prospective student-athletes and their families to ensure the
prospective student-athletes signed with Adidas-sponsored schools, and then
with Adidas and certain financial planners and agents once they turned
professional.1 In her opening statement, Casey Donnelly, Gatto’s attorney,
admitted that Gatto funneled $100,000 to the family of highly recruited prospect
Brian Bowen; paid $40,000 to the family of current Dallas Maverick Dennis
Smith, Jr. while he played for North Carolina State University; and paid $20,000
to Silvio De Sousa, who played for the University of Kansas during the second
semester of the 2017-18 season.2 Donnelly went on to state, “The NCAA rules
* Joshua is a Clinical Assistant Professor in the Recreation and Sport Management program at the
University of Arkansas (J.D., University of Iowa College of Law; B.A., University of Northern Iowa). Prior
to entering academia, Joshua spent seven years on Baylor University’s athletics compliance staff, during
which time he oversaw the university’s agent administration program. Thanks to the Sports Lawyers
Association Conference attendees for their feedback. Any views expressed in this Article are the author’s and
are not necessarily representative of the University of Arkansas or Baylor University. Any mistakes are, of
course, the author’s.
1. Mark Schlabach, James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins Found Guilty in Pay-for-Play Trial,
ESPN (Oct. 25, 2018), http://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/article/25072946/james-gatto-merl-code-christian
-dawkins-found-guilty-college-basketball-pay-play-trial (detailing outcome of trial).
2. Rob Dauster, Bombshells in Opening Statements of College Basketball Corruption Trial, MSN (Oct.
2,
2018),
https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/ncaabk/bombshells-in-opening-statements-of-college-
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are not the laws of the country . . . They’re the equivalent of the rules in your
apartment building. If you break them, you haven’t broken the law. It is not
against the law to violate NCAA rules.”3 Judge Lewis A. Kaplan reminded
jurors that NCAA rules were not on trial.4 Nonetheless, Donnelly’s statement
summarized the defendants’ primary defense--that their behavior violated
NCAA bylaws but did not break federal laws.5 After a three-week trial,
however, the jury found Gatto, Code, and Dawkins guilty on felony charges of
wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.6
Until recently, NCAA rules had long prohibited a basketball student-athlete
from both hiring and accepting benefits from an agent.7 Following federal
officials’ public disclosure of the investigation and release of complaints against
the defendants, and two months prior to the initial trial, the NCAA championed

basketball-corruption-trial/ar-BBNQKZj (describing Gatto’s legal defense strategy). Defense attorneys
contended in their opening statement that payment Adidas and Louisville worked to get for Bowen was
necessary to compete with the University of Oregon. See Ricky O’Donnell, College Basketball Corruption
Trial: 5 Things We Learned from Opening Arguments, SBNATION (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/
college-basketball/2018/10/2/17929420/fbi-college-basketball-corruption-trial-oregon-adidas-nike-arizonakansas-de-sousa (detailing early portion of initial trial).
3. Mark Schlabach and Jeff Borzello, Former Adidas Executive James Gatto Didn’t Break Law in
Orchestrating Payments to Recruits, Attorneys Say, ESPN (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.espn.com/menscollege-basketball/story/_/id/24872282/former-adidas-executive-james-gatto-break-law-orchestratingpayments-recruits-attorneys-say (detailing trial’s opening statements); see Michael McCann, College
Basketball Corruption Trial: Prosecutor’s Case, Explained, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 12, 2018,
https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/10/12/ncaa-corruption-bribery-trial-brian-bowen-christiandawkins (noting NCAA amateurism rules are not laws); see also Anne Ryman, NCAA FBI Investigation:
College Basketball Trial and What You Need to Know, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 19, 2019,
https://www.azcentral.com/story/sports/2019/04/18/ncaa-fbi-investigation-college-basketball-trial-arizonawildcats-sean-miller-adidas-nike-bribery/3468288002/ (noting defense attorney’s characterization of
prosecution’s allegations as a “novel theory”).
4. Dan Greene, College Basketball Trial Was Always About the NCAA’s Archaic Rules, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/10/24/ncaa-rules-recruitingbribery-corruption-trial-fbi (explaining that time and time again Kaplan made clear that case’s central question
was not whether defendants violated NCAA rules but if they undertook criminal actions and hid them from
universities).
5. See Marc Tracy, Three Found Guilty in N.C.A.A. Basketball Recruiting Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/sports/ncaa-basketball-adidas-guilty.html (describing trial
outcome); see also O’Donnell, supra note 2 (stating that defense showed its playbook during in opening
arguments); see also Dan Wetzel, Recruiting Allegations Fly as College Hoops Trial Begins, YAHOO SPORTS!
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://sports.yahoo.com/opening-statements-college-hoops-corruption-trial-drag-oregonfray-reveal-strategies-174516177.html (describing allegations coming out of opening of trial).
6. Tracy, supra, note 5 (noting that sentencing would occur in March 2019 with a two to four years prison
sentence possible); see Kaelen Jones, College Basketball Corruption Trial: Three Found Guilty, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/10/24/ncaa-trial-verdict-fbijames-gatto-christian-dawkins (explaining outcome of initial trial).
7. NCAA, 2018-19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.3.1 at 71 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL 2018-19].
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“significant changes” to men’s college basketball.8 Changes included the ability
of certain men’s basketball student-athletes to hire an agent to help them make
informed decisions about going pro.9 Further, these men’s basketball studentathletes may now accept certain benefits from agents under revised NCAA
rules. When an agent recruits one of the select men’s basketball student-athletes
who may hire an agent, the agent may pay for meals and transportation for the
student-athlete and his family when those expenses relate to the agent selection
process.10 Additionally, once the student-athlete signs with an agent, the agent
may pay for the student-athlete’s meals, transportation, and lodging when the
expenses relate to meetings with the agent or a professional team.11
When implementing these rules changes, the NCAA subsequently
recognized that the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”) and relevant state
laws based on it regulate the ability of agents to provide certain expenses prior
to signing a student-athlete to a representation agreement.12 Thus, the NCAA
determined that the rule change permitting pre-agreement benefits was not
effective immediately, but would become effective once states revised their
laws.13
There is an important asterisk, however, to both the NCAA’s
acknowledgment that one of its rule changes impacts an area regulated by states
and Donnelly’s assertion of the legality of the defendants’ admittedly NCAA
rule-breaking actions. Both the NCAA and the defendants failed to fully
recognize and account for the UAAA and its successor, the Revised Uniform
Athlete Agents Act (“RUAAA”), either of which the vast majority of states have

8. NCAA, Statement from NCAA Leaders on College Basketball Reforms, NCAA (Aug. 8, 2018),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/statement-ncaa-leaders-college-basketball-reforms
(describing changes resulting from federal investigation).
9. Id. (describing rules changes related to providing flexibility to men’s basketball student-athletes
considering leaving school early to turn professional).
10. See NCAA, Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree, NCAA (Sept. 20, 2018),
www.ncaa.org/about/flexibility-going-pro-and-getting-degree (describing NCAA-implemented changes
geared toward providing men’s basketball student-athletes additional freedom and flexibility to decide about
going pro or getting a college education) [hereinafter Going Pro].
11. Id. One may note the irony in the NCAA permitting certain men’s basketball student-athletes to hire
and receive benefits from agents when it was agents who were partly responsible for the corruption in the first
place. See Dan Wolken, NCAA Changes to College Basketball Seeking Reform are Mostly Cosmetic, USA
TODAY, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/columnist/dan-wolken/2018/08/08/
ncaa-college-basketball-reform-changes-mostly-cosmetic/938698002/ (arguing that permitting certain men’s
basketball student-athletes to have agents does not address what is actually against rules: agents funneling
money to teenage prospective student-athletes or to student-athletes while in college in exchange for becoming
a client once they turn professional). However, others believe the NCAA’s rules are the root cause of the
entire scenario. See Greene, supra note 4 (arguing that case was about the NCAA rules manual).
12. See Going Pro, supra note 10.
13. Id.
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adopted. While the NCAA recognized that its rule change regarding preagreement benefits conflicted with the UAAA and relevant state laws, it failed
to account for other ways in which its rule changes fail to fully align with the
UAAA and RUAAA and state laws based on them. When stating that the
defendants’ NCAA rule-breaking conduct did not violate the law, Donnelly and
the attorneys for the other defendants in the initial federal trial were surely
focused on the federal laws at issue. However, their blanket statements that their
clients did not break the law failed to recognize that their clients’ actions not
only broke NCAA rules but state laws based on the UAAA and RUAAA, too.
Section II of this Article describes the federal investigation into, and legal
proceedings regarding, corruption in men’s college basketball. Section III
details the background of the UAAA and RUAAA and applies their provisions
to the actions of the various defendants in the previous and upcoming trials.
This analysis reveals that the defendants’ actions triggered the application of
state athlete-agent laws, which, if properly monitored and enforced, could prove
an appropriate mechanism for deterring or addressing future similar instances.
Section IV details the NCAA’s response to the federal investigation, which
included revising rules applicable to men’s college basketball student-athletes.
As the rules changes caused NCAA legislation to fall out of line with UAAA
and RUAAA provisions, the Article concludes by suggesting revisions to the
acts to align them with these rules changes.
II. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING CORRUPTION IN MEN’S COLLEGE
BASKETBALL
One of the biggest stories in college sports history came to light in
September 2017.14 Federal investigators turned the men’s college basketball
world upside down when they made public a series of complaints depicting a
thriving black market in which coaches, agents, financial advisors, and shoe and
apparel company employees exploited naïve, young basketball studentathletes.15 On September 26, 2017, the Acting United States Attorney for the
14. See Matt Norlander, Ultimate College Basketball Corruption Scandal Primer: Explaining the Latest
with the FBI Probe, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/
ultimate-college-basketball-corruption-scandal-primer-explaining-the-latest-with-the-fbi-probe/ (providing
timeline of events associated with investigation and charges). The FBI started investigating men’s college
basketball after the Securities and Exchange Commission charged financial advisor Martin Blazer with fraud
and Blazer informed the FBI that he could bring to light fraud and corruption in college basketball recruiting.
15. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Coaches, Adidas Executive Face Charges; Pitino’s Program Implicated, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/sports/ncaa-adidas-bribery.html (detailing
officials’ announcement of charges and description of investigation); see Daniel Rapaport, FBI NCAA
Basketball Investigation Details: What We Know, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 17, 2017,
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Southern District of New York and the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New
York Office of the FBI announced the arrest of ten individuals.16 The
complaints charged then-Adidas employees Gatto, Code, and Jonathan
Augustine; athlete-advisors Dawkins, Muhish Sood, and Rashan Michel; and
then-assistant men’s basketball coaches Lamont Evans (Oklahoma State
University), Emanuel Richardson (University of Arizona), Tony Bland
(University of Southern California), and Chuck Person (Auburn University)
with wire fraud, bribery, travel act, and conspiracy offenses.17 The defendants,
if convicted of the charges, faced maximum prison sentences between 80 and
200 years.18
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI’s
multiyear investigation revealed two related schemes in the dark underbelly of
college basketball: the “Coach Bribery Scheme” and the “Adidas Scheme.”19
A. Coach Bribery Scheme
In the first scheme, athlete advisors Dawkins and Sood allegedly paid bribe
money to assistant men’s college basketball coaches, and sometimes directly to
current and prospective men’s college basketball student-athletes, facilitated by
the coaches.20 In exchange for the payments, the coaches agreed to pressure and
exert influence over student-athletes under their control to retain the services of

https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2017/09/29/what-we-know-about-each-school-fbi-investigation
(piecing together facts about investigation); see also Michael McCann, FBI College Basketball Corruption
Scandal: Next Steps, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 26, 2017, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2017/
09/26/fbi-corruption-college-basketball-fraud-louisville-bribe (explaining how NCAA notion of amateurism
is under attack).
16. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York Release, U.S. Attorney
Announces the Arrest of 10 Individuals, Including Four Division I Coaches, for College Basketball Fraud and
Corruption Schemes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/usattorney-announces-arrest-10-individuals-including-four-division-i-coaches-college (detailing investigation
and charges resulting therefrom) [hereinafter Department of Justice].
17. See id. The Department of Justice release and complaints refer to some entities generically, but
numerous individuals and media outlets have identified them (e.g., Adidas is “Company-1”). See also Jason
Kirk and Ricky O’Donnell, FBI College Basketball Investigation: 18 Key Names to Know for Now, SBNATION
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2017/9/27/16367814/ncaa-basketball-fbiinvestigation-coaches-agents-adidas. The universities who employed the four assistant coaches have since
terminated them. See Norlander, supra note 14 (providing timeline of events associated with investigation
and charges). Authorities ultimately dropped the charges against Augustine. See id.
18. See Department of Justice, supra note 16.
19. See id.; see also Tracy, supra note 15.
20. See Department of Justice, supra note 16.
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the bribe-payers once the athletes entered the NBA.21 Dawkins, “a 20something upstart” and “linchpin” of the scandal, formerly worked for sports
agent Andy Miller before going out on his own to start his own management
company called LOYD (“Live Out Your Dreams”).22 The allegations against
the four assistant coaches varied.23
1. Allegations Against Now-Former Auburn Assistant Men’s Basketball
Coach Chuck Person
A thirteen-year NBA veteran, now-former Auburn assistant men’s
basketball coach Chuck Person is the most prominent name among the
defendants.24 Person accepted $91,500 in bribe payments arranged by Michel
from a professional athlete financial advisor and business manager (the
“advisor”) in exchange for agreeing to direct certain student-athletes to retain
the services of the advisor.25 In helping further the advisor’s recruitment of

21. Id. At trial, Dawkins contended that he did not want to pay assistant coaches because he did not
believe they could influence student-athletes’ choices of agents, “By the time those kids get to college, the
deals are usually done. There’s no need to pay a college coach because these players are coming to college
with agents.” See Mark Schlabach and Jeff Borzello, Assistant: Miller Paid $10K Per Month to Ayton, ESPN
(May 2, 2019), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/26647372/miller-paid-10k-per-monthayton (describing wiretapped call implicating University of Arizona head men’s basketball coach Sean
Miller).
22. See Michael McCann, NCAA Corruption Trial: What to Expect in College Basketball Case, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, April 19, 2019, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/04/19/ncaa-corruption-recruitingtrial-christiandawkins?utm_campaign=sinow&utm_medium=social&xid=socialflow_twitter_si&utm_source=twitter.com
(previewing second trial); see also Gendry Estes, Who is Christian Dawkins and How is He Tied to NBA Agent
Andy Miller?, LOUISVILLE COURIER J., Feb. 23, 2018, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/
kentucky/2018/02/23/christian-dawkins-nba-agent-andy-miller-college-basketball-recruiting/366449002/
(detailing Dawkins’s connections and role in scandal). Miller, once considered one of the most powerful
agents in professional basketball with a client list including stars Kristaps Porzingis, Kyle Lowry, Serge Ibaka,
Dwight Howard, and Kevin Garnett, relinquished his agent certification in December 2017. Id. Authorities
have not charged Miller, who many believe is cooperating with the government. See Matt Norlander, College
Basketball’s FBI Probe Gets Specific With Players, Teams Named in Report, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/college-basketballs-fbi-probe-gets-specific-withplayers-teams-named-in-report/ (describing content of documents obtained in raid of Miller’s office).
23. In one recorded meeting, Dawkins explained, “agents obvious (sic) have influence, but you gotta get
the college coaches too . . . it’s almost like skipping a step if you just deal with agents.” See McCann, supra
note 15. Authorities caught Dawkins on wiretap explaining that the path to securing commitments from
college student-athletes went through assistant coaches, because head coaches “ain’t willing” to take bribes,
“cause they’re making too much money. And it’s too risky.” See Tracy, supra note 15.
24. See Kirk, supra note 17.
25. See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person). The advisor is a
cooperating witness for federal authorities. See also Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing Person’s alleged
involvement).
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student-athletes he coached, Person arranged multiple meetings between them.26
Person went so far as to lie to the mother of one student-athlete that the advisor
was Person’s own personal financial advisor and also advised NBA Hall of
Famer and Auburn alumnus Charles Barkley.27
Person also gave $18,500 of the bribe money he received to the families of
two student-athletes whom Person sought to steer to the advisor.28 Following
news of the federal investigation, Auburn suspended men’s basketball studentathletes Austin Wiley and Danjel Purifoy indefinitely.29 Later in the season,
Auburn deemed Wiley and Purifoy ineligible for the remainder of the 2017-18
season.30 In January 2018, the NCAA declared Wiley eligible for the 2018-19
season, noting Auburn had self-reported NCAA violations involving
impermissible recruiting, extra benefits, and agent-related activity.31 In March
2018, the NCAA ruled that Purifoy would regain eligibility after sitting out the
first 30 percent of the 2018-19 season due to concerns related to his connection
to the federal investigation.32
2. Allegations Against Now-Former Oklahoma State University Assistant
Men’s Basketball Coach Lamont Evans
Evans’s participation in the scheme was similar to that of Person. Evans
solicited $22,000 from two advisors—Sood and the same advisor with which
Person was involved—in exchange for Evans’s agreement to exert his official

26. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).
27. Id. (describing allegations against Person).
28. Id. (describing allegations against Person).
29. Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing investigation’s effects on Auburn University).
30. Mike Rutherford, How the FBI’s College Basketball Investigation Impacted Every School Involved,
SBNATION (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/9/26/17905914/fbi-collegebasketball-investigation-every-school-recruiting-louisville-usc-arizona (detailing effects of investigation on
involved universities).
31. NCAA, Wiley Eligible for 2018-19 Season, NCAA (Jan. 11, 2018), www.ncaa.org/about/resources/
media-center/news/wiley-eligible-2018-19-season (disclosing Wiley’s eligibility decision).
32. ESPN, Auburn Forward Danjel Purifoy to Regain His Eligibility After First 30 Percent of Next
Season, ESPN (Mar. 20, 2018), www.espn.in/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/22849959/auburn-forwarddanjel-purifoy-regain-eligibility-first-30-percent-next-season (describing NCAA decision regarding Purifoy’s
eligibility). Auburn’s men’s basketball program, thanks in part to contributions from Purifoy and Wiley,
enjoyed its best season in program history in 2018-19, winning 30 games, winning its first Southeastern
Conference tournament championship since 1985, and advancing to its first-ever Final Four. See Josh Vitale,
Looking Ahead to What Auburn Could Lose, Return and Add Next Basketball Season, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Apr. 9, 2019, https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/sports/college/auburn/2019/04/09/
looking-ahead-what-auburn-basketball-could-lose-return-add-next-season-harper-wiley-okeke-nbadraft/3408435002/ (summarizing Auburn’s season and looking ahead to next season). Wiley may test NBA
draft waters and forego his senior season of eligibility while Purifoy already announced he would return next
season for his senior year of eligibility. See id.
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influence over student-athletes he coached to retain the advisors’ services once
those student-athletes entered the NBA.33 Evans also received bribe payments
from Dawkins when the former coached at the University of South Carolina.34
To assist Sood and the advisor recruit the student-athletes he coached, Evans
arranged meetings for them with student-athletes.35 Evans also falsely touted
the services of Sood and the advisor to student-athletes and their families, telling
one student-athlete, for example, that the manager was Evans’s “guy,” and
promising that, “[i]t’s going to benefit you. I promise you that.”36
Oklahoma State announced in November 2017 it would withhold its top
player, Jeffrey Carroll, from competitions pending review of the program.37
Carroll missed three games before Oklahoma State cleared him to return.38
3. Allegations Against Now-Former University of Arizona Assistant Men’s
Basketball Coach Emanuel Richardson
Richardson accepted $20,000 in bribes from Dawkins, Sood, and two
undercover law enforcement agents posing as financial backers of the advisor
in exchange for Richardson’s commitment to steer student-athletes he coached
to retain Dawkins and Sood’s services upon entering the NBA.39 With respect
to one particular student-athlete he coached, Richardson assured Dawkins and
Sood that Richardson was the individual who the student-athlete trusted.40
Richardson facilitated at least one meeting between Dawkins, Sood, and a
representative of a student-athlete for the purpose of the representative
committing the student-athlete to retain Dawkins and Sood’s services.41
Richardson kept some of the bribe money and gave some to a recruit
believed to be class of 2018 prospective student-athlete Jahvon Quinerly.42

33. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Evans).
34. Id.; see Rapaport, supra note 15.
35. See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Evans).
36. Id.
37. Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing effects of federal investigation on implicated universities).
38. ESPN, Oklahoma State Clears Cowboys Guard Jeffrey Carroll to Play, ESPN (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/21490727/oklahoma-state-clears-cowboys-guard-jeffreycarroll-play (describing Oklahoma State announcement of Carroll’s pending return).
39. See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Richardson). Note the
absence of Code from the allegations regarding Richardson, as the University of Arizona is a Nike-sponsored
school. See also Rapaport, supra note 15.
40. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Richardson).
41. Id.
42. Rapaport, supra note 15.
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Amidst the federal investigation, Quinerly decommitted from attending Arizona
and ultimately enrolled at Villanova University.43
4. Allegations Against Now-Former University of Southern California Assistant
Men’s Basketball Coach Tony Bland
Bland accepted $13,000 in bribes from Dawkins and Sood in exchange for
Bland’s agreement to exert influence over student-athletes Bland coached to
retain Dawkins and Sood’s services once the student-athletes entered the
NBA.44 In fact, Bland told Dawkins and Sood, “I definitely can get the players
. . . . And I can definitely mold the players and put them in the lap of you guys.”45
At Bland’s direction, Dawkins and Sood paid or facilitated the payment of
an additional $9,000 directly to the families of two student-athletes.46 The
media has identified these two student-athletes as now-former USC men’s
basketball student-athlete De’Anthony Melton and prospective student-athlete
Taeshon Cherry.47 In return, Bland facilitated a meeting between Dawkins and
Sood and one of Melton’s relatives.48
B. Adidas Scheme
In the second scheme, athlete advisors Dawkins, Sood, and Augustine,
working with high-level Adidas executives including Gatto, allegedly paid or
conspired to pay bribes to student-athletes playing at, or recruited by, certain
universities, or to their families.49 Gatto and Code, who was at one time
affiliated with Adidas, paid the bribes in exchange for a commitment by the
athletes to matriculate at specific Adidas-sponsored universities, sign with
Adidas upon turning professional, and a promise to ultimately sign
representation agreements with the bribe-payors once the athletes entered the

43. Ryan Kelapire, Former Arizona Commit Jahvon Quinerly Disgruntled at Villanova?, SBNATION
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.azdesertswarm.com/basketball/2018/12/11/18137174/jahvon-quinerlyvillanova-disgruntled-arizona-commit-fbi-investigation-recruiting (describing timeline of Quinerly’s
university selection process). Quinerly has played sparingly this season and recently commented on his
Instagram, “was my 2nd choice for a reason,” perhaps indicating he is unhappy at Villanova. Id.
44. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Bland).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Mark Schlabach, Ex-USC Assistant Tony Bland Reaches Plea Deal in Hoops Scandal Case, ESPN
(Dec. 20, 2018), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/25582237/former-usc-trojans-assistanttony-bland-reaches-plea-deal-hoops-scandal-case (explaining current status of case involving Bland).
48. See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Bland).
49. Id. (describing Company-1 scheme).
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NBA.50 The allegations include multiple prospective student-athletes and
universities.
1. Allegations Involving Then-Prospective Student-Athlete Brian Bowen and
the University of Louisville
Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Sood worked together to funnel $100,000 from
Adidas to the family of then-high school basketball student-athlete Brian Bowen
in exchange for the Bowen’s commitment to both play at the University of
Louisville and retain Dawkins and Sood upon entering the NBA.51 Now-former
Louisville men’s basketball head coach Rick Pitino requested that Dawkins
make the payments.52 Because the payments violated both NCAA rules and
federal legislation, Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Sood used fake purchase orders,
invoices, and related documents to try and disguise the payments.53
Louisville suspended Bowen from the team indefinitely following the
allegations and ultimately released him from his scholarship.54 Bowen, who
never played a college game, entered the 2018 NBA draft pool but teams did
not consider him a viable prospect.55 Bowen now plays in Australia and recently
brought a lawsuit against Adidas and some of its employees and consultants
based on alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act.56 In large part due to the events surrounding Bowen,
Louisville fired Pitino and its athletic director at the time, Tom Jurich.57

50. Id.
51. See id. (describing allegations against Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Sood). The complaints did not
mention Bowen or Louisville by name but several media outlets identified them as the relevant parties, and
Louisville confirmed its involvement in the investigation. See also The Courier-Journal, University of
Louisville Scandal: Brian Bowen’s Mom Says She ‘Didn’t Know Anything,’ LOUISVILLE COURIER J., Sept.
27, 2017, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2017/09/26/university-louisvillerecruits-college-basketball-scandal/703820001/ (detailing University of Louisville’s alleged involvement in
scandal).
52. See Thomas Novelly, 1,300 Calls Part of Evidence in FBI’s College Basketball Investigation,
LOUISVILLE COURIER J., Dec. 21, 2017, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/
2017/12/21/fbi-college-basketball-investigation-university-louisville/973195001/(describing investigation,
specifically as it pertained to Louisville).
53. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Sood).
54. Novelly, supra note 52 (describing Bowen’s current status).
55. Matt Norlander, Former Louisville Recruit Brian Bowen Sues Adidas and Wants it to Stop Sponsoring
College
Basketball, CBS SPORTS
(Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/news/former-louisville-recruit-brian-bowen-sues-adidas-and-wants-it-to-stop-sponsoring-collegebasketball/ (detailing Bowen’s lawsuit against Adidas).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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2. Allegations Involving Prospective Student-Athlete Balsa Koprivica and the
University of Louisville
Dawkins and Augustine agreed to facilitate payments to the family of a high
school basketball student-athlete believed to be class of 2019 prospect Balsa
Koprivica in exchange for his commitment to play at Louisville and ultimately
retain Dawkins’s services.58 Recruiting analysts rank Koprivica, who is
originally from Serbia, as a top prospect in the 2019 high school class.59 Upon
implication in the federal probe, Koprivica’s Florida high school withheld him
from competition pending investigation to ensure his actions did not violate state
high school athletics regulations.60 Koprivica has since verbally committed to
attend Florida State University.61
3. Allegations Involving Prospective Student-Athlete Nassir Little and the
University of Miami
Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Augustine agreed to attempt to make payments
totaling as much as $150,000 from Adidas to prospective student-athlete Nassir
Little in order to secure his commitment to Adidas-sponsored University of
Miami.62 In exchange for the payment, Little would commit to both retaining
Dawkins’s services and signing with Adidas once he entered the NBA.63 Little

58. See id. The complaints did not mention Louisville or Koprivica by name but several media outlets
identified them as the relevant parties, and Louisville confirmed its involvement in the investigation. See
Gentry Estes, Louisville Recruiting Scandal: Did Documents Reveal Player 11?, LOUISVILLE COURIER J.,
Aug. 30, 2018, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2018/08/30/louisvillerecruiting-scandal-player-11-revealed-documents/1141432002/ (piecing together facts that identify relevant
prospective student-athlete).
59. See Buddy Collings, Balsa Koprivica Sits, Watches, Waits for Word on FBI Basketball Probe,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2017, https://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/highschool/os-sp-hs-balsakoprivica-sits-20171121-story.html (describing allegations involving Koprivica and current status with his
high school team).
60. Id. (noting that Koprivica and his mother deny wrongdoing).
61. MVA Basketball Athlete Balsa Koprivica Commits to FSU, MONTVERDE ACAD. (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://mvasports.com/news/2018/10/29/boys-basketball-mva-basketball-athlete-balsa-koprivica-commitsto-fsu.aspx (describing Koprivica’s verbal commitment and talents).
62. See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 16. The complaints did not mention Miami or Little by name but
several media outlets identified them as the relevant parties, and Miami confirmed its involvement in the
investigation. See also Rapaport, supra note 15. Trial evidence included text messages between Augustine
and Dawkins that revealed that the Little family was not interested in receiving any money, clearing the family
of wrongdoing. See also Mike Rutherford, 5 Winners and 7 Losers From the Big College Basketball
Corruption Verdict, SBNATION (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/10/
24/18009130/college-basketball-trial-winners-and-losers-arizona-louisville-duke-lsu (identifying perceived
winners and losers from the initial trial’s outcome).
63. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Augustine).
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ended up committing to attend and play basketball for the University of North
Carolina.64
Little averaged just under ten points and five rebounds per game for the Tar
Heels as a freshman in 2018-19.65 Shortly after the conclusion of his freshman
season Little declared for the NBA draft, hired an agent, and stated he will not
return for his sophomore season.66
4. Superseding Indictment Against Gatto, Code, and Dawkins
In April 2018, federal authorities released a superseding indictment against
Gatto, Code, and Dawkins.67 This indictment expanded the scope of the charged
wire fraud conspiracy to include alleged payments to the families of six studentathletes in connection with their decisions to attend four universities—the
University of Louisville, the University of Miami, the University of Kansas, and
North Carolina State University.68 Adidas sponsored all four universities.69
The superseding indictment contains additional details on how the
defendants steered, with tens of thousands of dollars, student-athletes to the
universities.70 For example, while unnamed in official records, multiple media
outlets reported that Code and Dawkins engaged in wire fraud to ensure that
highly coveted athletes Silvio De Sousa and Billy Preston enrolled at the
University of Kansas.71

64. Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing effects of federal allegations on University of Miami).
65. Brett Friedlander, UNC Freshman Little Declares for NBA Draft, N. ST. J., April 1, 2019,
https://nsjonline.com/article/2019/04/unc-freshman-little-declares-for-nba-draft/
(describing
Little’s
freshman season and decision to enter draft).
66. Id.
67. See Dep’t of Just., U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York Release, U.S. Attorney’s
Office Announced Additional Charges Against Athletic Apparel Company Executive and Others for Allegedly
Defrauding Four NCAA Division I Universities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (April 10, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-s-office-announces-additional-charges-against-athleticapparel-company (announcing filing of Superseding Indictment) [hereinafter Superseding Indictment].
68. Id. (describing allegations in Superseding Indictment).
69. See id.
70. See Norlander, supra note 14 (updating effects of charges on college basketball). Authorities dropped
Sood from the superseding indictment, indicating he cooperated with authorities. See Aaron Moody, NCAA
College Basketball Fraud Scandal: FBI Investigation Info, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 4, 2018,
https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/article208880939.html (describing investigation, relevant individuals,
and theories of case). In fact, Sood reached a plea deal with federal prosecutors in which he pled guilty to
three felonies and agreed to testify against other defendants. See Mark Schlabach, Munish Sood Pleads Guilty
in NCAA Basketball Corruption Case, ESPN (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.espn.com/mens-collegebasketball/story/_/id/24539543/munish-sood-pleads-guilty-ncaa-basketball-corruption-case (detailing Sood’s
plea deal).
71. Norlander, supra note 14.
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C. Trials
Two federal trials regarding corruption in men’s college basketball took
place. Throughout their fall 2018 trial on charges related to the alleged “Adidas
Scheme,” Gatto, Code, and Dawkins admitted they violated NCAA rules in
order to induce prospective student-athletes to attend Adidas-sponsored schools;
however, each denied committing federal crimes.72 The jury heard testimony
detailing gas station meetups, cash-stuffed magazines, secret “bat phones,” and
sham invoices.73 Testimony implicated, or at the very least mentioned, highprofile schools like Kansas, Louisville, Arizona, NC State, LSU, DePaul, Duke,
Kentucky, and North Carolina.74
A New York jury unanimously convicted Gatto, Code, and Dawkins of wire
fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.75 Prosecutors won because they
convinced the jury that the defendants paid top men’s basketball prospects
thousands of dollars to attend certain Adidas-sponsored universities in violation
of NCAA rules.76 Intending to send “a great big warning light to the basketball
world,” a judge sentenced Gatto to nine months in prison and Code and Dawkins
six months in prison apiece.77 Attorneys for Gatto and Dawkins indicated their
clients will appeal.78
The second trial, which particularly garnered attention from men’s college
basketball’s coaching fraternity, pertained to the alleged “Coach Bribery
Scheme.”79 Prosecutors alleged that Dawkins and Code bribed a number of
72. Jones, supra note 6.
73. Danielle Lerner, College Basketball FBI Trial: Verdict Sets Tone for Future, LOUISVILLE COURIER
J., Oct. 19, 2018, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2018/10/19/collegebasketball-recruiting-fbi-investigation-trial-verdict-sets-tone-future-cases/1682044002/
(describing
testimony and evidence presented at trial).
74. Id.
75. Michael McCann, Why the Prosecution Won in the College Hoops Corruption Trial and What’s Next,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/10/24/ncaa-corruptionfbi-trial-verdict-analysis (explaining trial outcome and likely outcomes); see Tracy, supra note 5 (describing
trial outcome).
76. See McCann, supra note 75 (noting that those in the basketball and apparel industries knew of this
practice for decades).
77. Christian Red, Three Men Sentenced to Prison for Role in FBI College Basketball Corruption Case,
USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2019/03/05/fbi-college-basketballtrial-prison-sentences-handed-out-three-men/3067964002/ (describing March 2019 sentencing of three
defendants).
78. Tracy, supra note 5 (explaining initial trial’s outcome and its lack of effects on everyday operations
in men’s college basketball); see Jones, supra note 6 (noting that appeal timeline is undetermined).
79. See Matt Norlander, Christian Dawkins’ Compelling and Contention Testimony vs. Prosecutors
Highlights College Hoops Federal Case, CBS SPORTS (May 2, 2019), https://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/news/christian-dawkins-compelling-and-contentious-testimony-vs-prosecutors-highlightscollege-hoops-federal-case/ (describing Dawkins’s testimony).

LENS – ARTICLE 30.1

60

1/10/2020 11:59 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1

assistant coaches, including Bland, Richardson, Evans, Creighton assistant
coach Preston Murphy, and TCU assistant coach Corey Barker.80 Jurors in the
second trial returned guilty verdicts on two (of six) charges faced by Dawkins
and on one (of four) charges faced by Code.81 Jurors convicted Dawkins of
bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery while they convicted Code of
conspiracy to commit bribery82. Jurors found Dawkins and Code not guilty on
charges of wire fraud and conspiracy to violate the travel act and, in the case of
Code, not guilty on a bribery charge.83 Sentencing will occur at a later date.84
While Dawkins and Code face maximum prison sentences measured in years,
in reality those sentences will likely last a few months each.85
In the meantime, all four assistant coaches reached plea agreements with
federal prosecutors.86 Bland pled guilty to one count of federal funds bribery,
for which the punishment could range from probation to a one-year prison
sentence.87 In April 2019, Bland received a sentence of two years of probation
and 100 hours of community service for his involvement in the scandal.88
Richardson pled guilty to one count of federal funds bribery and faces up to two

80. See Michael McCann, What’s Next for Sean Miller, Arizona After the Final Week of the College
Basketball Corruption Trial?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 3, 2019, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/
2019/05/03/college-basketball-corruption-trial-christian-dawkins-merl-code-arizona-university-legaltakeways (describing second trial).
81. Michael McCann, Federal Prosecutors Get Underwhelming Win in Second College Hoops Corruption
Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 8, 2019, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/05/08/corruptiontrial-christian-dawkins-merl-code-guilty-verdicts?utm_source=twitter.com/&utm_medium=social&utm_
campaign=sinow&xid=socialflow_twitter_si (describing results of second trial and characterizing verdicts as
a win for prosecutors but not a knockout).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Larry Neumeister, 2 Convicted in College Basketball Corruption Trial, STAR TRIBUNE, May 8, 2019,
www.startribune.com/2-convicted-in-college-basketball-corruption-trial/509651602/ (detailing outcome of
second trial).
86. Larry Neumeister, Ex-Auburn Assistant Chuck Person Pleads Guilty in Basketball Bribery Scandal,
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, March 19, 2019, https://tucson.com/sports/ex-auburn-assistant-chuck-person-pleadsguilty-in-basketball-bribery/article_2bc3da9e-4a94-11e9-a03e-1395946c7141.html (detailing Person’s plea
deal).
87. Joey Kaufman, Former USC Assistant Tony Bland Reaches Plea Deal in College Basketball
Corruption Case, ORANGE CTY. REG., Dec. 20, 2018, https://www.ocregister.com/2018/12/20/former-uscassistant-tony-bland-reaches-plea-deal-in-college-basketball-corruption-case/ (detailing Bland’s plea deal).
88. Emily Carton, Ex-USC Assistant Tony Bland Sentenced in College Basketball Corruption Trial,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 5, 2019), https://www. si.com/college/2019/06/05/former-usc-assistant-tonybland-sentenced-college-basketball-corruption-trial.
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years in prison.89 Evans pled guilty to a federal conspiracy bribery charge,
admitting he received $22,000 to steer student-athletes he coached to certain
financial advisors and business managers.90 Evans, a citizen of Barbados, faces
not only up to two years in prison but also the possibility of deportation.91
Person pleaded guilty to a bribery conspiracy charge, which typically carries a
prison sentence of two to two and a half years.92 Person admitted to accepting
$91,500 in bribes to steer players to a financial adviser and will forfeit that
amount as part of the plea.93 In all, ten men were found guilty or accepted plea
deals.94
D. Aftermath of Trials
Many wonder whether the guilty verdicts in the initial trial will effect what
is widely considered business as usual in college basketball.95 Some believe
that, despite the guilty verdicts that laid bare the open secret of the vast influence
of apparel companies in men’s college basketball, basketball operators continue
to connect families of valuable prospects with money in violation of NCAA

89. Alexis Mansanarez, Former Arizona Assistant Book Richardson Reaches Plea Deal in Bribery Case,
SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-basketball/news/ncaa-mensbasketball-news-former-arizona-wildcats-assistant-book-richardson-reaches-plea-deal-in-federal-briberycase/14fnc4i27ut4m1geflby4c1qt1 (describing Richardson’s plea deal).
90. ESPN News Services, Lamont Evans Pleads Guilty to Bribery Charge, ESPN (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/25885440/lamont-evans-pleads-guilty-briberycharge (describing proceedings involving Evans).
91. Id. (quoting Evans, “I now know that accepting those funds in exchange for introducing them to any
one player was wrong and violated the law.”).
92. Neumeister, supra note 86 (detailing Person’s plea deal and noting Person’s sentencing will occur in
July 2019).
93. Id.
94. Pat Forde, Pete Thamel, & Dan Wetzel, Can NCAA Handle Hoops Scandal? ‘It’s Time to Get This
Right,’ YAHOO! SPORTS (May 9, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/can-ncaa-handle-hoops-scandal-its-time-toget-this-right-173558292.html?soc?src=social-sh&soc_trk=tw (anticipating NCAA investigation).
95. Tracy, supra note 5 (explaining initial trial’s outcome and its lack of effects on everyday operations
in men’s college basketball); see Ben Gamble, How Did College Basketball Land in Federal Court and Where
Does it Go from Here?, ST. LOUIS U. L. J., https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2018-19/collegebasketball-federal-court.php (predicting aftermath of initial federal trial); see also Will Hobson, Charges
Involving Kansas, N.C. State Make It Clear: FBI Is Enforcing NCAA Rules, WASH. POST, April 13, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/latest-college-basketball-charges-make-it-clear-the-fbi-isenforcing-ncaa-rules/2018/04/13/d49e40f4-3e8e-11e8d53-eba0ed237; see also Dan Wetzel, How One
Basketball Middleman Exposed College Amateurism and Clowned the FBI, YAHOO! SPORTS (May 1, 2019),
https://sports.yahoo.com/how-christian-dawkins-exposed-college-amateurism-231944769.html (describing
Dawkins’s testimony in second trial); see also Dan Wetzel, FBI Surveillance Videos Show How College
Athletics Is a Cesspool, But NCAA Doesn’t Care Enough to Watch, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://sports.yahoo.com/fbi-surveillance-videos-show-corruption-everywhere-in-college-athletics210716764.html (noting that NCAA power players did not come view trial).
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amateurism rules.96 For example, Syracuse University head men’s basketball
coach Jim Boeheim stated, “The verdict doesn’t mean anything. What’s there
is there. What’s there is not good . . . . They broke an awful lot of NCAA rules.
I’m not sure they broke the law.”97
However, contrary to both Boeheim’s thoughts and defense attorney Casey
Donnelly’s claim in opening statements of the initial trial, the cases serve as
precedent that violating NCAA legislation can result in consequences beyond
NCAA penalties.98 Further, U.S. District Court Judge Loretta A. Preska rejected
Person’s argument in a pretrial motion that the federal government was
attempting to make federal crimes out of unreported NCAA rules violations.99
Anyone associated with men’s college basketball who tries to bribe others not
only has to worry about possible adverse NCAA and employment
consequences, but the far worse prospect of a prison sentence.100
Those who feel that the trials will not change the underground landscape of
men’s college basketball note the lack of charges against head coaches.101
Defense attorneys subpoenaed Louisiana State University (“LSU”) head men’s
96. Tracy, supra note 5; see Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, New Pressures, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/26/guilty-verdict-college-basketball-corruption-trial-putsnew-pressure-ncaa (describing outcomes of initial federal trials); see also Sam Mellinger, The Shame of the
NCAA’s Handling of Kansas Basketball Player Silvio De Sousa, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 2, 2019,
https://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columns-blogs/sam-mellinger/article223798645.html (explaining that
NCAA was embarrassed when its sausage-making secrets went public); see also Andy Staples, What Has the
NCAA—or Anyone—Learned from the College Basketball Black Market’s Time on Trial?, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 9, 2019, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/05/09/ncaa-trial-fbi-briberycorruption-mark-emmert?utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=social-sharearticle&utm_content=20190509 (contending that federal investigation and tax dollars spent on it netted “A
fart in a stiff wind”).
97. Luke Decock, Guilty Verdicts Irrelevant to NCAA’s Task Ahead, But This May Offer Impetus for
Action, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/article220559155.html
(predicting NCAA’s actions in light of verdict). Some believe the defendants should not have been prosecuted
in the first place, as the prosecutions raised the question of overcriminalization; in other words, prosecutors
misused the law in an attempt to solve a societal ill and punish a paltry iniquity. See Sally Jenkins, As Next
College Basketball Corruption Trial Begins, It’s Time to Ask: Is This Worth It?, WASH. POST, April 21, 2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/as-next-college-basketball-corruption-trial-begins-its-timeto-ask-is-this-worth-it/2019/04/19/8eb429da-62ca-11e9-bfad-36a7eb36cb60_story.html?utm_term=.2ab1d6
e4695c (questioning propriety of prosecuting Code and Dawkins).
98. See Tracy, supra note 5 (quoting former Big 12 commissioner Dan Beebe, “Now you don’t just have
to worry about what the NCAA does to you—you have to worry about going to jail.”).
99. Mark Schlabach, Charges from FBI’s College Corruption Investigation to Remain, ESPN (Jan. 4,
2019),
www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/25677971/federal-charges-college-corruptionprobe-go-forward (describing outcome of hearing on Person’s motion seeking dismissal).
100. McCann, supra note 80 (adding that this additional deterrence could dissuade some from partaking
in wrongdoing).
101. Id.; see Billy Witz, Who’s on Trial in the College Basketball Scandal? Not the Big Names, N.Y.
TIMES, April 23, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/sports/college-basketball-trial-arizonalsu.html.
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basketball coach Will Wade and University of Arizona head men’s basketball
coach Sean Miller to testify at the second trial.102 Defense attorneys hoped to
elicit testimony including discussion of Wade’s alleged phone conversation with
Dawkins in which Wade speaks freely about a “strong ass offer” he made to a
prospective student-athlete, likely Javonte Smart, who ultimately enrolled at
LSU and played for Wade.103 When news of the scandal broke, reports linked
Miller to Dawkins through phone records.104 Specifically, media scrutinized the
University of Arizona’s recruitment of DeAndre Ayton, who played at Arizona
for a year before entering the NBA draft, in which the Phoenix Suns selected
him as the first overall pick.105 However, a judge, on a motion by prosecutors,
ruled that the anticipated testimony describing Dawkins’s relationship and
interactions with both Wade and Miller was irrelevant and thus they did not have
to testify.106
Federal authorities recently gave the NCAA the green light to proceed with
investigating potential NCAA rules violations.107 Many, however, grow
102. Pat Forde et al., Exclusive: Wiretap Reveals LSU Coach Will Wade Discussed Recruiting “Offer”
with Hoops Scandal Middleman, YAHOO! SPORTS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/exclusivewiretap-reveals-lsu-coach-will-wade-discussed-recruiting-offer-hoops-scandal-middleman-175046487.html
(describing Wade’s alleged role in scandal).
103. Id. LSU suspended Wade after he declined to speak with university officials as part of the
investigation into the wiretapped phone conversation between Wade and Dawkins. See Charlotte Carroll, Will
Wade Reinstated by LSU After Meeting with School, NCAA Officials, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 14, 2019,
https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/04/14/lsu-reinstated-head-coach-will-wade-recruiting-scandal
(describing circumstances surrounding Wade’s suspension and reinstatement). LSU reinstated Wade a little
more than a month later after he met with university and NCAA officials. See id.
104. Glenn Guilbeau, Report: LSU’s Will Wade, Arizona’s Sean Miller Face Subpoenas in FBI
Corruption Case, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2019/02/26/
sean-miller-will-wade-subpoena-fbi-basketball-corruption-case/2989524002/ (describing circumstances
leading to subpoenas for Miller and Davis).
105. Id. Jurors heard an FBI-intercepted call between Dawkins and Richardson during which Richardson
told Dawkins that Miller was paying, or had promised to pay, $10,000 a month for Ayton. See Pete Thamel
and Dan Wetzel, Wiretaps Played in Federal Court Allege Arizona’s Sean Miller Paid Players, YAHOO!
SPORTS (May 1, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/arizona-sean-miller-paid-players-wiretaps-federal-hoopscorruption-case-153718418.html (describing trial ongoings implicating Miller). Miller denies any
wrongdoing. See id.
106. Jason Owens, Sean Miller, Will Wade Won’t Testify in College Hoops Corruption Trial; Wiretaps
Won’t Be Heard, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 19, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/sean-miller-will-wade-wonttestify-in-hoops-corruption-trial-wiretaps-wont-be-heard-201612772.html (describing judge’s ruling). The
decision on Miller and Wade sparked cynicism among the coaching community. See Pat Forde et al., Judge’s
Ruling Rocks College Hoops World: ‘I Should Have Cheated My Whole Career,’ YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 19,
2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/judges-ruling-rocks-college-hoops-world-i-should-have-cheated-my-wholecareer-234403238.html (describing judge’s decision and reactions to it). “If these guys get away with it,” one
veteran head coach said, “I should have cheated my whole career.” See id.
107. Gamble, supra note 95. The NCAA Enforcement Staff provided a verbal notice of inquiry to the
University of Louisville in March 2019. See Tim Sullivan, Louisville Recieves NCAA Notice of Inquiry;
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increasingly frustrated with the NCAA’s enforcement of its rules, especially
considering it was federal authorities, not the NCAA, who discovered the
NCAA rules-violating actions in the first place.108 More than fifty schools have
at least been named in one form or fashion via federal documents, court
evidence, testimony, or original reporting.109
III. UAAA AND RUAAA BACKGROUND AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE
DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS
A. UAAA and RUAAA Background
The Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”), also known as the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, provides states with nonpartisan legislation that attempts to bring clarity and stability to critical areas of
state statutory law.110 Recognizing that an agent’s recruitment of an enrolled
student-athlete can lead to eligibility problems for both the student-athlete and
university, severe economic sanctions, and loss of scholarships, the ULC drafted
the UAAA in 2000 to govern relations among student-athletes, athlete-agents,
and universities.111 Thus, the UAAA protects the interests of student-athletes
and universities by regulating athlete-agents and their actions.112 Some say that,
in protecting these interests, UAAA drafters focused solely on deterring athlete-

Mack, Brown Jr. Respond, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/
sports/college/louisville/2019/04/10/university-louisville-receives-notice-inquiry/3429881002/ (describing
response to notice). The allegations against the four assistant coaches, if true, could results in the NCAA
Enforcement Staff charging the assistant coaches with violations of NCAA legislation including Bylaw 11.1.3,
which prohibits athletics department staff members from: (1) representing an individual in the marketing of
his athletics ability or reputation to an agent and (2) receiving compensation or gratuities for same. See NCAA
Manual 2018-19, supra note 7, at § 11.1.3. While reports have not directly implicated the head coaches at
these four universities, NCAA rules presume responsibility for head coaches for major violations of NCAA
legislation within their programs. See generally Josh Lens, NCAA Head Coach Responsibilities Legislation,
14 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. 33 (2018) (detailing NCAA head coach responsibilities legislation and its application
and providing recommendations for head coaches to consider implementing to mitigate likelihood of
allegation or finding).
108. See McCann, supra note 15 (noting that NCAA lacks both resources and, as a private actor, subpoena
power); see also Norlander, supra note 79 (noting that it took a 26-year old runner and convicted felon to
voice truth to problems facing men’s college basketball).
109. Forde, supra note 94 (noting that more than half the programs from the seven most prominent
conferences have been associated with activity that could draw scrutiny).
110. REVISED UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, About UCL (UNIF. LAW COMM’N. 2015), [hereinafter
RUAAA] available at https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?
DocumentFileKey=6a97db74-446e-e102-f517-0bd54fbb7ff4&forceDialog=0 (last visited Feb. 11, 2019)
(describing ULC and its functions).
111. Id. at 1 (providing reasons for drafting the UAAA).
112. Id.
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agents from encouraging amateur athletes to turn professional or accept money
in violation of NCAA rules.113 Forty-two states enacted the UAAA.114
On its website, the NCAA states it “supports the Uniform Athlete Agents
Act (UAAA) and its adoption in every state…. The UAAA is an important tool
in regulating the activities of athlete agents and protecting NCAA studentathletes and member institutions.”115 In fact, the NCAA’s website includes a
page entitled, “Need For and Benefits of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act
(UAAA).”116
As time passed, several states amended their respective acts to deal with a
perceived lack of enforcement, broaden coverage of the act, and require notice
to educational institutions prior to an agent contacting an enrolled studentathlete.117 Variations between states put uniformity at risk and may have
discouraged reputable agents from complying with the UAAA.118 To address
these issues and modernize the UAAA in an ever-evolving sports commercial
marketplace, the ULC drafted the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act
(“RUAAA”) in July 2015.119
Fourteen states have enacted the RUAAA, and nine other states introduced
it in 2019.120 Further, dozens of college athletics administrators and coaches
voiced support for and urged adoption of the RUAAA in a memo to officials
who work with legislators in each state.121 Among the 55 individuals who
signed the memo are 16 athletic directors at Autonomy Five conference schools;
113. Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA and Sparta: How America Should Reform
its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 169 (2013)
(explaining that “groupthink” led to this approach as no drafter had participated in college or professional
sports).
114. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, REVISED, Enactment Map: Description, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Communitykey=4d46906c-2d24-4ede-84aba57b40fa5c37&tab-groupdetails (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) (providing interactive map detailing individual
states’ adoptions of athlete-agent laws) [hereinafter RUAAA Map].
115. NCAA, Agents and Amateurism, NCAA, www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism (last
visited Feb. 11, 2019) (describing the UAAA and NCAA’s support of it).
116. NCAA, Need For and Benefits of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA), NCAA,
www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism/need-and-benefits-uniform-athlete-agents-act-uaaa (last
visited Feb. 11, 2019) (listing benefits of UAAA) [hereinafter NCAA Need For and Benefits of the UAAA].
117. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 2 (explaining reasons behind drafting of the RUAAA).
118. Id.
119. Id; see Why Your State Should Adopt the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2015), UNIF. LAW
COMM‘N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=a59a2
fe8-009d-fdab-dcb1-402b39176bb3&forceDialog=0 (last visited April 25, 2019) (detailing benefits of
RUAAA).
120. RUAAA Map, supra note 114.
121. Aaron Beard, Schools, Coaches Push for Adoption of Strengthened Agent Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/273a069e034d4a12ab0bd8f6c67e01f3 (detailing memo).
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NFL agents Jack Bechta, Bus Cook, and Bruce and Ryan Tollner; and coaching
figures including University of Connecticut head women’s basketball coach
Geno Auriemma, University of Virginia head football coach Bronco
Mendenhall, now-former Louisiana State University (and current University of
Kansas) head football coach Les Miles, former University of Nebraska head
football coach Tom Osborne, Florida State University head football coach
Willie Taggart, and University of North Carolina head men’s basketball coach
Roy Williams.122 With the support of these administrators and coaches, Dale G.
Higer, an Idaho attorney who helped draft the RUAAA, hopes over half of the
states adopt it by 2020.123 Of note is the fact that, in light of the federal
investigation and cases involving men’s college basketball, Southeastern
Conference Commissioner Greg Sankey recently reiterated that states should
have a role in pursuing these cases.124
B. Application of UAAA and RUAAA Provisions to the Defendants’ Actions
The NCAA, college athletics administrators, coaches, and agents support
the UAAA and RUAAA for myriad reasons, including the hope that the acts
effectively regulate agents due in large part to the acts’ potential for criminal,
civil, and administrative penalties.125 Most states have adopted the UAAA or
RUAAA.126 As the following examples illustrate, the alleged actions of the
defendants in the college’ men’s basketball cases, if true, trigger the application
of several UAAA and RUAAA provisions and thus imposed several obligations
and restrictions on these individuals.
1. The alleged actions of defendants Dawkins, Sood, Code, Gatto, and the four
assistant coaches, if true, meet UAAA and RUAAA definitions of “athleteagent” and thus trigger athlete-agent status
Whether an individual triggers athlete-agent status under the UAAA and/or
RUAAA depends not on how the individual refers to herself or himself but
rather on the individual’s actions. The UAAA defines an athlete-agent as an
individual who solicits or recruits a student-athlete to enter into an agency

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Associated Press, Violation of Sports Agent Laws Tough for States to Prosecute, USA TODAY, Nov.
1, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2017/11/01/violatoin-of-sports-agent-laws-tough-forstates-to-prosecute/107223304/ (examining reasons why states fail to prosecute violators).
125. See NCAA Need For and Benefits of the UAAA, supra note 116; see also Beard, supra note 121.
126. See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 2; see also RUAAA Map, supra note 114.

LENS – ARTICLE 30.1

1/10/2020 11:59 AM

2019] ATHLETE AGENT LAWS AND COLLEGE BASKETBALL 67
contract.127 Thus, the UAAA definition of athlete-agent could include licensed
financial advisors, even those who do not refer to or consider themselves athleteagents, if they recruit a student-athlete to enter into an agency contract.128
Because financial advisors often failed to register as athlete-agents and
comply with the UAAA, the ULC revised the definition of “athlete agent” in the
RUAAA such that it includes an individual who:
(1) directly or indirectly recruits or solicits a student-athlete
enter into an agency contract; (2) for compensation or in
anticipation of compensation related to a student-athlete’s
participation in athletics, serves the athlete in an advisory
capacity on a matter related to finances, business pursuits, or
career management decisions; or (3) in anticipation of
representing a student-athlete for a purpose related to the
athlete’s participation in athletics, gives consideration to the
student-athlete or another person.129
In revising its definition of athlete-agent in the RUAAA, the ULC intended to
remove ambiguity of its applicability to financial advisors.130
In both acts, the ULC defined recruit and solicit as attempting to influence
a student-athlete or her or his parent or guardian on the choice of an athleteagent.131 The UAAA was silent on the issue of whether a college coach’s actions
could trigger athlete-agent status; however, when considering the definition’s
verbiage, a coach who recruited or solicited a student-athlete to enter into an
agency contract was an athlete-agent.132 The UAAA does not contain an explicit
exception for college coaches. In a Comment to the RUAAA, the ULC
explained that coaches and parents who receive compensation or expect to
receive compensation in exchange for advising a student-athlete to select a
particular agent meet the definition of athlete-agent and thus trigger athleteagent status.133
The alleged actions of defendants Dawkins, Sood, Code, Gatto, and the four
assistant coaches fall within the acts’ definitions of athlete-agent. The federal
complaints describe Dawkins as an athlete-advisor and allege that he bribed the
127. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 8 (explaining that ULC outwardly expanded definition of athlete-agent
to include financial advisors because, due to ambiguity of UAAA definition of athlete-agent, financial advisors
often failed to register as athlete-agents).
128. See id.
129. Id. at 4. The definition of “student athlete” applies to individuals who are not yet in college; thus, it
includes high school students. See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 9.
130. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 8.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 8-9.
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four assistant men’s basketball coaches to direct their student-athletes to retain
Dawkins once the student-athletes entered the NBA.134 Federal authorities
alleged that Dawkins is a runner—he befriended elite prospective studentathletes and NBA prospects in hopes of both becoming their manager and
influencing their choices regarding financial advisors, shoe companies, and
agents.135 For example, Dawkins was allegedly among a group that attempted
to funnel $150,000 to Little to get him to commit to the University of Miami,
then sign with Adidas and Dawkins’s agency upon turning professional.136
At one point in his career, Dawkins made $50,000 in annual salary
recruiting NBA draft prospects on behalf of a financial advising firm.137
Dawkins also worked for ASM Sports, the sports agency of the aforementioned
Andy Miller that represented professional basketball players.138 Dawkins
helped ASM Sports sign 2017 NBA draftees Justin Patton of Creighton
University and Edmond Sumner of Xavier University.139 By soliciting studentathletes on behalf of agents and advisors and paying assistant coaches
Richardson and Bland to exert their influence over student-athletes to eventually
sign with Dawkins, Dawkins’s actions meet the athlete-agent definition under
both the UAAA and RUAAA.
Sood founded Princeton Capital, an investment services firm that manages
professional athletes’ finances.140 The UAAA and RUAAA definitions of
athlete-agent both include financial advisors.141 Further, Sood allegedly made
bribe payments to the four assistant coaches in exchange for their agreement to
direct student-athletes they coached to retain Sood once the student-athletes
entered the NBA.142 By making bribe payments to assistant coaches so they
would exert influence over student-athletes to retain Sood once they entered the
NBA, Sood’s actions triggered athlete-agent status under the RUAAA definition
of athlete-agent.143
134. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Dawkins).
135. Mark Schlabach and Jeff Goodman, How Christian Dawkins Went from Unknown to a Central
Figure in a Scandal that Has Rocked College Basketball, ESPN (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.espn.com/menscollege-basketball/story/_/id/20946451/how-christian-dawkins-went-unknown-central-figure-scandalrocked-college-basketball (describing Dawkins’s background and alleged roles in corruption in men’s college
basketball).
136. Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing individuals facing federal charges).
137. Schlabach & Goodman, supra note 135.
138. Id. (explaining that Dawkins may have actually worked for the financial advising firm and sports
agency simultaneously, the subject of a lawsuit).
139. Id. (noting that both players fired ASM after federal authorities arrested Dawkins).
140. Rapaport, supra note 15.
141. See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 8-9.
142. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations involving Sood).
143. See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 4.
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Even though they were affiliated with Adidas and were not contract or
financial advisors, the alleged actions of Gatto and Code likewise elicit athleteagent status under both the UAAA and RUAAA. Federal authorities allege that
Gatto and Code were among a group that paid prospective student-athletes to
attend certain universities and then sign with Adidas and a particular contract
advisor or financial manager upon turning professional.144 For example, along
with Sood, Gatto and Code allegedly paid $100,000 to prospective studentathlete Brian Bowen so he would verbally commit to attending the University
of Louisville, have Sood manage his money, and sign with Adidas upon entering
the NBA.145 By soliciting or recruiting someone to enter into an agent agreement
and providing him compensation in anticipation of representing him for a
purpose related to the athlete’s participation in athletics (e.g., as an Adidas
client), Gatto and Code’s actions meet both the UAAA and RUAAA definitions
of athlete-agent, rendering them subject to the acts and state laws based on them.
By attempting to influence a student-athlete’s choice of financial advisor
and/or agent and receiving compensation for it, the actions of the four assistant
coaches trigger athlete-agent status under both the UAAA and RUAAA and thus
they were subject to state laws based on them. More specifically, Person
allegedly accepted bribe payments in exchange for agreeing to direct certain
student-athletes to retain the services of a financial advisor, arranged meetings
between student-athletes and the advisor, and paid families of two studentathletes whom Person sought to steer to a manager 146 Richardson, Bland, and
Evans allegedly accepted bribe payments in return for their commitments to
steer student-athletes they coached at their respective universities to retain
Dawkins’s and/or Sood’s services upon entering the NBA.147 Both Richardson
and Bland also facilitated at least one meeting apiece between Dawkins, Sood
and a student-athlete or his representative so the student-athlete would commit
to retaining Dawkins and Sood’s services.148

144. Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing individuals facing federal charges).
145. Id. (identifying Nassir Little as another prospective student-athlete with whom Gatto and Code
attempted to become involved).
146. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).
147. Id. (describing allegations against Richardson, Bland, and Evans).
148. Id. (describing allegations against Richardson and Bland).
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2. The UAAA and RUAAA and states that adopted them require an individual
to register with and hold valid certification from the state before lawfully
acting as an athlete-agent within the state.149
As shown in the previous section, the actions of defendants Dawkins, Sood,
Code, Gatto, and the four assistant coaches conferred athlete-agent status on
those individuals under both the UAAA and RUAAA. Thus, in UAAA and
RUAAA states, athlete-agent laws required them to register in, and hold valid
certification from, the states in which they acted as athlete-agents for those
actions to have been lawful.150
It is highly unlikely that Dawkins, Sood, Code, Gatto, and the four assistant
coaches thought to register as athlete-agents in the states in which they acted as
such, let alone took steps to register as athlete-agents. For example, The State
of Alabama has enacted the RUAAA.151 Alabama law requires an individual to
register with the state prior to acting as an athlete-agent within the state.152
Person allegedly: (1) accepted bribe payments from a financial advisor in
exchange for agreeing to direct certain Auburn student-athletes to retain the
advisor’s services; (2) arranged meetings between student-athletes and the
advisor; and (3) gave bribe money to the families of two student-athletes to steer
them to the advisor.153 By those actions, Person garnered athlete-agent status
under Alabama law.154 However, Person is not listed in the Alabama Secretary
of State’s online database listing registered athlete-agents.155 Under Alabama
law, an athlete-agent may not initiate contact to recruit a student-athlete to enter
an agency contract within Alabama unless the athlete-agent first registers.156 By
recruiting student-athletes to enter an agency contract as an unregistered athleteagent, Person committed a Class A misdemeanor.157 Further, Person could be
subject to a civil penalty up to $50,000 for violating Alabama athlete-agent
laws.158
149. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 10-11.
150. See id.
151. RUAAA Map, supra note 114.
152. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-4 (2016), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/default/
files/2016-415.PDF.
153. See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).
154. See Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-2(2) (2016), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/
default/files/2016-415.PDF.
155. Athlete Agent Listing, Alabama Secretary of State, http://arc-sos.state.al.us/cgi/athname.mbr/output
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
156. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-14(b)(1) (2016), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/
default/files/2016-415.PDF.
157. See id. at §8-26B-15(c).
158. See id. at §8-26B-17.
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3. The UAAA and RUAAA prohibit athlete-agents from giving materially false
or misleading information or making a materially false promise or
representation.159
Both the UAAA and RUAAA prohibit athlete-agents from giving materially
false or misleading information or making a materially false promise or
representation during recruitment of a student-athlete.160 Person falsely told the
mother of an Auburn student-athlete he coached that the financial advisor to
whom Person sought to steer the student-athlete was Person’s own advisor and
also advised Charles Barkley.161 In doing so, Person broke Alabama’s version
of the RUAAA prohibition on giving materially false or misleading information
or making a false representation during recruitment of a student-athlete.162
Under Alabama law, Person’s misrepresentations constitute a Class B felony.163
Evans also falsely touted the services of Sood and the advisor to Oklahoma
State student-athletes and their families, dishonestly telling one student-athlete,
for example, that the manager was Evans’s “guy.”164 The State of Oklahoma
adopted a version of the UAAA.165 By falsely telling or misleading a studentathlete that Evans used Sood’s services, Evans violated Oklahoma law.166 Thus,
under Oklahoma law, Evans committed a misdemeanor that could subject him
to a fine between $10,000 and $250,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year.167
4. The UAAA and RUAAA contain prohibitions on athlete-agents offering
items of value to certain individuals during recruitment of student-athletes.168
During an athlete-agent’s recruitment of an athlete, the UAAA and RUAAA
prohibit an athlete-agent from furnishing anything of value to an athlete prior to
the athlete entering the agency contract.169 The RUAAA also prohibits an

159. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 2, 41.
160. Id; see The Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2015) – A Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM‘N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=aceaa
94e-e641-45a6-f481-b43973739b82&forceDialog=0 (describing agents who mislead student-athletes as
unethical).
161. See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).
162. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-14(a)(1) (2016).
163. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-15(a) (2016).
164. Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Evans).
165. See Kelli Masters, So You Want to Be a Sports Agent?, OKLA. BAR J. (Oct. 2018),
https://www.okbar.org/barjournal/oct2018/obj8926masters/ (describing requirements of athlete-agents).
166. 70 OKLA. STAT. §70-821.94.A.1 (2014).
167. 70 OKLA. STAT. §70-821.95 (2018).
168. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 2.
169. Id.
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athlete-agent from: (1) encouraging any other individual to take or assist another
individual in taking any prohibited actions on behalf of the agent and (2) making
any payment or providing anything of value to an individual who is in a position
to influence a student-athlete to enter into an agency contract unless that
individual is registered as an athlete-agent.170
The allegations surrounding Person provide an example of the application
of the legislation. An advisor, who by his actions is an athlete-agent under
Alabama law, paid bribe money to Person in exchange for Person agreeing to
direct student-athletes to retain the advisor’s services.171 Person, whose actions
also trigger athlete-agent status under Alabama law, allegedly paid $18,500 to
the families of two student-athletes whom Person sought to steer to the
advisor.172 In making the payments, the advisor and Person both violated
Alabama’s version of the RUAAA prohibition on athlete-agents furnishing
anything of value to certain individuals.173 By engaging in this prohibited
conduct, both Person and the advisor committed Class B felonies under
Alabama law.174
5. The RUAAA requires athlete-agents to notify a university’s athletic director
prior to lawfully engaging in certain contact with student-athletes.175
The RUAAA requires an athlete-agent to notify the university’s athletic
director prior to communicating or attempting to communicate with: (1) a
student-athlete to influence him to enter into an agency contract or (2) another
individual to have that individual influence the student-athlete.176 In adding
these requirements, the ULC intended that universities receive prior notice of
communication between an athlete-agent and an enrolled student-athlete.177
Person allegedly accepted $91,500 in bribe payments from an advisor in
exchange for agreeing to direct certain student-athletes to retain the services of
the advisor.178 Person arranged multiple meetings between student-athletes and
the advisor during which Person (falsely) touted the advisor’s qualifications.179
It is highly unlikely that the advisor notified Auburn’s athletic director of his
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 2-3, 41.
Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).
Id.
Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-14(a)(3) (2016).
Id. at §8-26B-15(a) (2016).
RUAAA, supra note 110, at 38-39.
See id.
See id. at 39.
Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).
Id.
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communication with Person (someone with influence over a student-athlete) or
the meetings with student-athletes. Further, it is highly unlikely that Person
notified Auburn’s athletic director of the meetings Person arranged between the
student-athletes and the advisor (whose actions triggered athlete-agent status).
In fact, Auburn president Steven Leath said shortly after Person’s arrest that
there was no indication that anyone at Auburn knew anything about Person’s
involvement in the scandal.180 Thus, both the advisor and Person violated
Alabama law notification requirements that mirror RUAAA provisions.181
6. Both the UAAA and RUAAA provide for civil penalties and remedies.182
Both the UAAA and RUAAA permit the state official or entity responsible
for enforcement of the act to assess a civil fine on athlete-agents for violating
the legislation.183 Further, the UAAA provides for a civil cause of action for a
university against a student-athlete for damages caused by a violation of the
act.184 Under the RUAAA, a university or student-athlete may bring an action
against an athlete-agent if the university or student-athlete is adversely affected
by an athlete-agent’s violation of the act that results in suspension of the studentathlete.185
The situation at Auburn again provides an example of the legislation’s
potential application. Auburn suspended men’s basketball student-athletes
Austin Wiley and Danjel Purifoy following news of the federal investigation.186
Auburn admitted that Person gave $11,000 to Purifoy’s mother and $7,500 to
Wiley’s mother and thus Auburn would withhold the pair from competitions “to
avoid any potential issues.”187 Because Person’s action (providing money to the
student-athletes’ mothers) resulted in the suspensions of the student-athletes,
Alabama’s law based on the RUAAA affords Auburn and the student-athletes a

180. See Tom Green, Auburn President on Chuck Person Arrest: “This Was an Isolated Individual,”
AL.COM (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.al.com/auburnbasketball/2017/09/auburn_president_on_chuck_
pers.html (providing Leath’s reaction to Person’s arrest).
181. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-11(f) (2016).
182. See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 43-44.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See Rapaport, supra note 15.
187. See Erik Hall, Danjel Purifoy: A Timeline of His Auburn Basketball Career, FBI Investigation
Fallout, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 2018, https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/
sports/2018/12/14/danjel-purifoy-timeline-auburn-college-basketball-fbi-fallout-bruce-pearl/2318376002
(providing timeline of Purifoy’s Auburn career).
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civil cause of action against Person.188 Under Alabama law, a prevailing
plaintiff may recover actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.189
Further, if enforced, Person would be subject to an Alabama Secretary of State
fine of up to $50,000 for violating the act.190
C. State Athlete-Agent Laws and Lack of Resources
The UAAA and RUAAA, and state versions of them, were applicable to the
actions of the defendants in the men’s college basketball case yet there are no
public reports of state authorities using athlete-agent laws to discipline the
defendants. States rarely enforce their respective versions of the UAAA or
RUAAA.191 In fact, there are few cases of prosecution of agents under the
acts.192 One prominent agent describes enforcement of state agent laws as
“lacking.”193 In fact, a recent Associated Press review found that more than half
of the then 42 states with athlete-agent laws had yet to revoke or suspend a single
license or invoke penalties of any sort.194
According to the individual state entities responsible for enforcing their
athlete-agent laws, a main reason for the lack of enforcement is that athleteagent laws often come with no funding.195 This lack of resources negatively
affects the success of state athlete-agent laws in deterring elicit acts, including

188. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-16(a)(1) (2016). Auburn self-reported violations of
NCAA amateurism provisions involving recruiting issues, extra benefits, and agent-related activity. See
Matthew Stevens, NCAA Rules Danjel Purifoy to Serve Suspension But Will be Eligible for 2018-19 Season,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Mar. 20, 2018, https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/sports/college/
aburn/2018/03/20/ncaa-rules-danjel-purifoy-serve-suspension-but-eligible-2018-19-season/444143002/
(describing NCAA rulings on Purifoy and Wiley).
189. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-16(b) (2016).
190. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-17 (2016).
191. See Commission on College Basketball, Report and Recommendations to Address the Issues Facing
Collegiate Basketball, COMM’N ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL, 34 n.25 (Apr. 2018), available at
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018CCBReportFinal_web_20180501.pdf (issuing a report and
recommendations to NCAA Board of Governors, Division I Board of Directors, and NCAA President Mark
Emmert). See also Associated Press, AP Study: Laws for Sports Agents Rarely Enforced, DENVER POST, May
5, 2016, https://www.denverpost.com/2010/08/17/ap-study-laws-for-sports-agents-rarely-enforced/ (detailing
AP survey).
192. See James Masteralexis et al., Enough is Enough: The Case for Federal Regulation of Sport Agents,
20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69, 90 (2013) (suggesting adoption of federal legislation applicable to
athlete-agents).
193. See Masters, supra note 165.
194. Associated Press, supra note 191 (describing state athlete-agent laws as a “low priority” for many
states).
195. See id. (noting that the State of North Carolina had to use state workers who usually investigated
securities fraud to look into possible violation of its athlete-agent laws). See also Associated Press, supra note
124 (quoting Sankey, “There’s clearly a role for states.”).
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athlete-agents routinely offering inducements to athletes to sign them.196
Practically, state-level investigators and prosecutors face a dilemma of where
these cases fit when violent crimes and high-level felonies are priorities and
space-eaters on court schedules.197
Unless things change, the unfortunate reality of lack of sufficient funding to
give state athlete-agent laws teeth results in potentially effective and deterrent
state legislation with the possibility of criminal prosecution, civil fines and civil
causes of action left on the sideline. The availability of these private causes of
action are especially important for universities, as they face the possibility of
losing millions of dollars if subject to NCAA sanctions resulting from a studentathlete’s violation of NCAA rules.198 If the university is state-subsidized, the
state may also suffer financial harm due to athlete-agent actions, thus providing
even more incentive for states to enforce their athlete-agent laws.199
IV. SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO THE UAAA, RUAAA, AND STATE ATHLETEAGENT LAWS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE NCAA’S RECENT RULES CHANGES
State officials responsible for enforcement of athlete-agent laws failed to
apply those laws to the actions of the defendants in the federal probe of
corruption in men’s college basketball. Likewise, the NCAA failed to account
for the UAAA, RUAAA, and state athlete-agent laws when it made broad,
sweeping changes to rules applicable to men’s basketball following news of the
federal investigation.
A. The NCAA’s Response to the Federal Investigation
1. The Commission on College Basketball and its Report
Federal authorities did not notify the NCAA about the investigation until
the day they announced charges against the ten defendants.200 In fact, the

196. See Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and Unintended Consequences,
WAKE FOREST U. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, 26 (2006)(describing effects of various athlete-agent
regulations). See also Masteralexis, supra note 192, at 70.
197. See Associated Press, supra note 124 (noting that violations of athlete-agent laws, while felonies,
are typically low-level felonies).
198. See Timothy G. Nelson, Flag on the Play: The Ineffectiveness of Athlete-Agent Laws and
Regulations—and How North Carolina Can Take Advantage of a Scandal to be a Model for Reform, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 800, 816 (2012) (citing the University of Southern California as an example).
199. See Diane Sudia and Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millennium: State Statutes
and the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 273 (2001) (describing myriad
authorities regulating athlete-agents).
200. See Norlander, supra note 14.
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announcement caught NCAA President Mark Emmert off guard.201 In an
ambitious response to news of the federal investigation, the NCAA Board of
Governors, Division I Board of Directors, and NCAA President established the
Commission on College Basketball in October 2017.202 Composed of
individuals such as former U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice (chair
of the Commission), Ohio State University athletics director Gene Smith, NBA
legends David Robinson and Grant Hill, and former head coaches Mike
Montgomery and John Thompson, III, the Commission’s charges included the
gathering of information to make transformative recommendations to protect
the integrity of men’s college basketball.203
In its 2018 Report and Recommendations to Address the Issues Facing
Collegiate Basketball, the Commission acknowledged that men’s college
basketball is a multi-billion dollar enterprise, which can increase the incentive
for elite student-athletes, coaches, universities, apparel companies, agents, and
advisors to break rules.204 More specifically, the Commission recognized that
third parties--including agents, apparel companies, and advisors--seeking to
enter into relationships with potential professionals when they are in high school
and college violate NCAA rules by paying players and those with influence over
players, including coaches, in hope of future payoff.205 To its credit, the
Commission recognized that these payments violate the UAAA and RUAAA.206
Further, college coaches and third parties such as apparel companies, agents,
and advisors may pay family members of prospective student-athletes who have
influence over the prospect.207
In its Report, the Commission made a number of recommendations
including implementation of an NCAA certification process and requirement of
athlete-agents as well as providing for opportunities for certified athlete-agents
to engage with student-athletes.208 Recognizing that increased contact between
athlete-agents and student-athletes can lead to impermissible payments and
201. See Tracy, supra note 15 (noting that Emmert pledged the NCAA’s support of the federal
investigation from the start).
202. See Commission on College Basketball, Commission on College Basketball Charter, NCAA, § 1
(Apr. 2018), available at www.ncaa.org/governance/commission-college-basketball-charter (including
information on the group including its charges, makeup, and responsibilities).
203. See id. at §§ 2-3; see also Myron Medcalf, New NCAA Rules are More Cosmetic Than They Are
Consequential, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2018), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_id/24320626/ncaarule-changes-not-address-issues-fbi-investigation (questioning effectiveness of NCAA’s changes to men’s
basketball rules).
204. Commission on College Basketball, supra note 191 at 18.
205. See id. at 29-30.
206. See id. at 44.
207. See id. at 25.
208. See id.
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other violations, the Commission recommended serious consequences for
NCAA-certified agents who violate NCAA rules.209 The Commission
concluded that apparel companies have served as a harmful influence on men’s
college basketball, and, as public companies, should provide increased
transparency about spending on non-scholastic basketball.210
2. NCAA rules changes responsive to both the federal investigation and
Commission recommendations
The NCAA created quite a stir with its first legislative action after the
federal case became public.211 In August 2018, the NCAA made “profound and
meaningful changes to college basketball” intended to support the success of
student-athletes on and off the court.212 To do so, the NCAA pushed through
rules changes in about three and a half months that would normally take years
through the NCAA’s standard governance process.213 One intent of the changes
is to minimize the leverage of outside influences on prospective and current
student-athletes.214
For example, the NCAA implemented a rule requiring coaches and athletics
staff members to report to university presidents or chancellors athletics-related
income from any outside source greater than $600.215 In its release, the NCAA

209. See id. at 44. This is all the more reason for increasing education and enforcement of state athleteagent laws.
210. See Commission on College Basketball, supra note 191 at 11-14.
211. See Jon Nyatawa, The NCAA Enacted Various Basketball Rule Changes. How Will They Affect Local
Teams?, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.omaha.com/sports/the-ncaa-enacted-variousbasketball-rule-changes-how-will-they/article_2c2fe63d-1606-5518-acd9-bc0ca182f1e6.html
(detailing
NCAA legislative changes and effects on Omaha-area men’s college basketball programs).
212. See NCAA, Statement From NCAA Leaders on College Basketball Reforms, NCAA (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2018-08-08/statement-ncaa-leaders-college-basketballreforms (describing purposes behind changing rules applicable to NCAA men’s basketball) [hereinafter
NCAA Statement]. Some feel the rules changes stop short of accomplishing transformative and meaningful
change. See also Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, “Committed Change” for Men’s Basketball, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug.
9, 2018), https://www.insidehighred.com/news/2018/08/09/new-ncaa-rules-allow-mens-basketball-playershave-agents-return-college-if-undrafted (characterizing NCAA’s reforms as “small” yet cast as “glorious”).
213. See Fox News, NCAA Adopts College Basketball Policy Changes Based on Condoleezza Rice
Panel’s Recommendations, FOX NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/sports/ncaa-adopts-collegebasketball-policy-changes-based-on-condoleezza-rice-panels-recommendations (describing NCAA rules
changes).
214. See NCAA, Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences, NCAA (Aug. 8, 2018), www.ncaa.org/about/
minimizing-harmful-outiside-influences (describing rule changes intended to reduce the leverage of harmful
outside influences on current and prospective men’s basketball student-athletes).
215. Id.
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specifically listed endorsement or consultation contracts with apparel
companies as an example of an outside source.216
Further, in a stark departure from its longtime ban on agent involvement,
the NCAA now permits agent representation for men’s basketball studentathletes with remaining collegiate eligibility who request an evaluation from the
NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee.217 A recent example of a studentathlete taking advantage of this rule change is University of Minnesota junior
guard Amir Coffey. Following the 2018-19 season, Coffey requested an
Advisory Committee evaluation, declared for the draft, and hired an agent.218
Due to recent NCAA rules changes, Coffey can go through the draft process
with the assistance of an agent yet retain collegiate eligibility if he decides to
return to school.219
Additionally, the NCAA also now permits high school seniors identified as
elite prospects to hire agents.220 The NCAA deemed the rule change permitting
agents for certain current men’s basketball student-athletes effective
immediately and the rule change applicable to certain prospective men’s
basketball student-athletes effective if or when the NBA and NBPA permit high
school students to enter the NBA draft.221
Not only may certain men’s basketball student-athletes permissibly hire
agents, the NCAA also changed its rules such that it is permissible for agents to
pay certain expenses for these student-athletes.222 Agents may now pay for
meals and transportation for student-athletes and their families if the expenses
relate to the agent selection process.223 Further, once a high school or college
student-athlete and agent sign a representation agreement, agents may
216. Id.
217. Going Pro, supra note 10. See Mark Tracy, N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of
Basketball Corruption Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/sports/
ncaa-basketball-agents.html. The NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee is composed of NBA team
executives who, upon request of an undergraduate student-athlete, provide a confidential projection of a
potential draftee’s likely draft position. See Memorandum from NCAA to NCAA Division I Directors of
Athletics, Senior Compliance Administrators and Men’s Basketball Head Coaches (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/enforcement/2019ENF_NBAMemo.pdf (describing “testing the waters”
process for undergraduate men’s basketball student-athletes).
218. See Marcus Fuller, Amir Coffey Declares for NBA Draft and Will Hire Agent, but Could Return to
Gophers, STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 4, 2019, www.startribune.com/amir-coffey-declares-for-nba-draft-and-willhire-agent-but-could-return-to-gophers/508078242/ (describing Coffey’s decision and application of new
NCAA legislation).
219. Id.
220. Going Pro, supra note 10.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. Any student-athlete for whom an agent pays these expenses may not miss class and the money
must be spent where the student-athlete lives or attends school.
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permissibly pay for meals, transportation, and lodging expenses for the athlete
and his family members when those expenses relate to meetings with the agent
or a professional team.224
For better or worse, the NCAA pushed these rules changes through without
sorting through particulars.225 Emmert and top NCAA officials acknowledged
at the time that they had yet to work out several details.226 In a statement
describing the purposes of the rules changes, Emmert, NCAA Board of
Governors chair and Georgia Tech president G.P. “Bud” Peterson, and Division
I Board of Directors chair and University of Minnesota, Twin Cities president
Eric Kaler noted that the NCAA would continue to pursue collaboration with
outside organizations, including the NBA and apparel companies.227 Dan
Gavitt, the NCAA’s senior vice president of basketball, later admitted there was
a “breakdown in communications” between the NCAA and the NBA, NBPA,
and USA Basketball.228 Notably absent from the list of entities with which the
NCAA stated it would continue to pursue collaboration is the ULC, the entity
responsible for drafting the UAAA and RUAAA.229 This absence is telling, as
it shows that the NCAA continues to overlook the importance of alignment with
the drafters of the athlete-agent legislation the NCAA, despite pledging full
support on its very own website, had just trampled.
To its credit, the NCAA recognized that the UAAA, RUAAA, and relevant
state laws prohibit agents from providing expenses to prospective clients prior
to signing them.230 “Currently, many if not most of all the UAAA laws do not
allow for several of the things that we would like this agent relationship to allow
for,” said Gavitt.231 “Currently, I believe, agents cannot provide meals and
224. Id.
225. See Matt Norlander, College Basketball Rule Changes: What Will Happen With the NCAA’s New
Rules for Recruiting and the NBA Draft, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/news/college-basketball-rule-changes-what-will-happen-with-the-ncaas-new-rules-for-recruitingand-the-nba-draft/ (summarizing interview with Dan Gavitt).
226. See Nyatawa, supra note 211 (querying whether NCAA moved too quickly).
227. NCAA Statement, supra note 212. Both the NBA and USA Basketball had consulted with the
NCAA on proposed changes but neither organization believed the group reached a consensus prior to the
NCAA announcement of its rule changes. Jim Young, NCAA Changes Policies on Draft, Agents, Recruiting;
NBA Reportedly ‘Blindsided’, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-basketball-ncaancaa-agents-draft-idUSKBN1KT2D4 (describing interplay between NCAA and various entities prior to
NCAA rules changes applicable to men’s college basketball).
228. Andy Katz, What You Need to Know About Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree, NCAA
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2018-08-09/college-basketball-rulechanges-what-you-need-know-about (summarizing NCAA rules changes).
229. See NCAA Statement, supra note 212; see also Young, supra note 227. The NCAA and ULC were
to participate on a conference call in August 2018. See also Nyatawa, supra note 211.
230. See Going Pro, supra note 10.
231. Norlander, supra note 225 (noting that NCAA had been in touch with ULC).
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transportation and things like that to a prospect and their family—not based on
our rules, but UAAA.”232 Thus, the NCAA made its new rule permitting agents
to provide pre-agreement expenses effective after the UAAA, RUAAA, and
state laws change and align with the revised NCAA rules.233
B. Necessary Revisions to the UAAA, RUAAA, and State Athlete-Agent Laws
The NCAA’s website states that it supports the UAAA “and its adoption in
every state….The UAAA is an important tool in regulating the activities of
athlete agents and protecting NCAA student-athletes and member
institutions.”234 The NCAA goes so far as to provide a sample advocacy letter
to a senator or representative urging adoption of the UAAA, a sample supportive
testimony in favor of the UAAA, and a model press release for legislative staffs
that sponsor the UAAA.235 The NCAA has a unique way of showing this
support, however, having revised its rules such that some now conflict with
UAAA and RUAAA provisions.
Now the ULC and individual states must revise the UAAA, RUAAA, and
laws if they desire consistency with NCAA legislation.236 Politicians in
Kentucky, for example, considered revising state athlete-agent laws prior to the
scandal in men’s college basketball.237 Now in the midst of the aftermath of the
initial trial, including an NCAA investigation of the University of Louisville,
Kentucky lawmakers seek to strengthen state laws governing athlete-agents.238
Missouri lawmakers responded to the federal probe similarly, introducing a bill
that would toughen the state’s athlete-agent laws.239

232. Id.
233. Going Pro, supra note 10. On the other hand, the new rule permitting expenses for student-athletes
who sign with an agent is effective immediately.
234. NCAA, Agents and Amateurism, NCAA, www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism (last
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing athlete-agent authorities and NCAA’s position on them).
235. See id.
236. One respected academic argues that, instead of individual states conforming their laws to changes to
NCAA legislation, the NCAA should conform its legislation to match state laws, as the purpose of state law
is to declare and enforce values from which individual organizations may not vary. E-mail feedback from
Alfred C. Yen, Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School, to Sports
Lawyers Association Conference article presentation (May 15, 2019).
237. See Linda Blackford, Kentucky Lawmakers Seek to Tighten Rules on Sports Agents, LEXINGTON
HERALD LEADER, March 7, 2018, https://www.kentucky.com/news/local/education/article203881199.html
(describing legislative reform efforts in Kentucky).
238. Id.
239. See Aaron Reiss, Missouri Legislators Want Sports Agents to Follow These Rules Because of FBI
Probe,
KAN.
CITY
STAR,
April
27,
2018,
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politicsgovernment/article209939374.html (describing legislative efforts in Missouri).
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1. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to more clearly state that the actions of
coaches and financial advisors can meet the definition of athlete-agent and
trigger athlete-agent status
As seen in Section III.B.1., supra, the actions of the defendants in the men’s
college basketball trial triggered the athlete-agent designation when applying
each act’s definition of athlete-agent. However, reaching this conclusion
requires thoughtful application and research that the ULC could avoid with
slight revisions to the UAAA and RUAAA.240 The UAAA is silent on the
issue.241 The RUAAA references the possibility of coaches triggering athleteagent status when, for example, advising a student-athlete to select a particular
agent when the coach receives compensation from the agent.242 However, this
reference is in the definition of “Recruit or solicit” (instead of within the
definition of “Athlete agent”) and in a comment that may not appear within the
legislation itself when adopted and published by states. Thus, ULC drafters
should consider explicitly referencing coaches and financial advisors possibly
triggering athlete-agent status in the text of any provision that includes the
definition of an athlete-agent. This would not only increase clarity but help put
those individuals on notice.
2. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to account for the fact that select men’s
basketball student-athletes may now hire agents and retain collegiate eligibility
to compete
When the NCAA, in a landmark and unilateral decision, permitted select
men’s basketball student-athletes to hire agents, yet retain collegiate eligibility
to compete, the organization overturned its own longstanding rule.243 When
drafting the UAAA and RUAAA, the ULC presumably took the NCAA’s
prohibition on student-athletes hiring agents for granted, and incorporated the
ban into the acts’ language. For example, both acts require agents to notify
student-athletes who sign an agency contract that signing it may render them
ineligible.244 Under recently changed NCAA legislation, however, when an
eligible men’s basketball student-athlete hires an agent and opts to not enter the
240. See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 8-9.
241. Id. at 8.
242. Id. at 9.
243. See Michael McCann, What’s Really to Come From the NCAA’s Student-Athlete Agent
Announcement?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/08/08/
ncaa-agents-student-athlete-one-and-done-nba-draft (explaining that NCAA long feared that attorneys,
accountants, and other informed adults acting as agents would exploit, rather than inform and educate, college
athletes).
244. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 35-37.
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NBA draft and returns to his university, he retains eligibility to compete if he
terminates his agreement with the agent.245 Thus, ULC drafters should consider
amending the acts to require agents signing a men’s basketball student-athlete
to notify him how he may retain eligibility to compete collegiately or at least
advise him to seek counsel from his university regarding maintaining eligibility.
Further, ULC drafters should consider requiring agents to file evidence of
termination of the agreement with both the appropriate state entity and athletics
department.
3. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to permit agents to provide certain men’s
basketball student-athletes and their family members with expenses associated
with the agent selection process
Due to the NCAA’s recent changes to its longstanding and rigid rules,
agents may pay for meals and transportation for select men’s basketball studentathletes and their family members if the expenses relate to the agent selection
process.246 However, both the UAAA and RUAAA prohibit agents from
furnishing anything of value to an athlete or any other individual before the
athlete enters into a contract.247 The ULC, if it seeks to align its acts with recent
NCAA rules changes, must insert an exception to the prohibition on furnishing
anything of value to permit agents to pay for these now NCAA-permissible
expenses related to the agent selection process.
Both acts already require athlete-agents to retain and make available to the
state records of “the direct costs incurred by the agent in the recruitment or
solicitation of each student athlete to enter into an agency contract.”248 If agents
are aware of and follow this requirement (and states enforce it), they may be less
likely to make payments to student-athletes or their family members (i.e.,
payments beyond the permissible meals and transportation expenses) that could
render a student-athlete ineligible to compete under NCAA rules.249 Further,
245. See NCAA, supra note 8.
246. Going Pro, supra note 10. See McCann, supra note 243 (explaining that rule change helps create a
normal experience for elite college athletes who sometimes see classroom peers wined and dined by corporate
recruiters without accompanying worry of NCAA eligibility).
247. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 7, 41.
248. Id. at 2, 40.
249. ULC drafters may also consider requiring individuals registering as athlete-agents within a state to
disclose during the registration process whether they represent any university employees within the state.
Further, both the UAAA and RUAAA require athlete-agents to disclose certain information (e.g., a description
of services the agent will provide) to the athlete at signing. See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 1, 35. ULC
drafters should also consider requiring athlete-agents to disclose on the warning provision of the representation
agreement whether they represent any employees of the university the student-athletes attend. It is a conflict
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the ULC may wish to consider expanding the document retention and
availability requirement to allow a university to request and obtain
documentation of costs incurred by an agent in the recruitment of the
university’s student-athlete(s).
4. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to prohibit agents from offering or
providing an item of value to an individual to increase the likelihood that an
athlete attends a particular university
The “Prohibited Conduct” section of both the UAAA and RUAAA contain
prohibitions on athlete-agents from furnishing anything of value to an athlete
prior to the athlete entering into a representation agreement.250 Further, the
RUAAA prohibits athlete-agents from furnishing anything of value to an
individual other than the athlete.251 However, these prohibitions apply to
furnishing anything during the athlete-agent recruitment process only.252
One could argue that the defendants in this case furnished items of value
(i.e., money) to prospective student-athletes in order to influence their university
selection process separate from the athlete-agent recruitment process. However,
federal authorities describe, and jurors confirmed, that the bribe payors paid
prospective student-athletes in exchange for a commitment by the athletes to
matriculate at a specific university and a promise to ultimately sign
representation agreements with the bribe-paying advisors.253 Including in the
acts a prohibition on athlete-agents furnishing an item of value to an athlete or
another individual in order to facilitate matriculation at a specific university
would clear up any confusion. Additionally, including such a prohibition would
further align the acts with NCAA regulations. In 2012, the NCAA expanded its
definition of agent to include an individual who “seeks to obtain any type of
financial gain or benefit from securing a prospective student-athlete’s
enrollment” at a university.254

of interest for a coach’s agent to recruit the coach’s draft-eligible underclassman. See Josh Lens, When a
College Coach’s Agent Recruits the Coach’s Players: Potential Legal and NCAA Ramifications, 26 JEFFREY
S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 13-14 (2019). This alerts the student-athlete, and potentially others, of the potential
for a conflict of interest and would help mitigate the likelihood of someone the student-athlete trusts falsely
telling a student-athlete that an individual represents him such as was the case with assistant coaches Person
and Evans.
250. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 41-42.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Department of Justice, supra note 16.
254. NCAA Manual 2018-19, supra note 7, at § 12.02.1.
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5. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to account for the NCAA’s new athleteagent registration
A facet of the package of changes to rules applicable to men’s college
basketball is a new NCAA agent certification process.255 Several of the acts’
provisions dealing with the athlete-agent registration process require the
applicable state entity’s registration application to inquire of certification by any
professional sports players association(s) (e.g., National Basketball Players
Association).256 If the ULC wants to recognize the entirety of recent changes to
NCAA rules, it should update the acts’ provisions regarding the agent
registration process to include the NCAA within the list of possible entities with
which the agent is certified.
V. CONCLUSION
Most states have passed a version of the UAAA or RUAAA to regulate
athlete-agent behavior and protect universities. However, despite recent
widespread corruption in men’s college basketball, state entities and individuals
charged with enforcing state athlete-agent laws failed to detect the
transgressions and/or pursue penalties against wrongdoers whose actions should
have triggered the application of the laws. Hopefully the recent scandal in men’s
college basketball brings attention to the need for enforcement of state athleteagent laws, which, if properly enforced, are equipped to serve not only as a
powerful deterrent to illicit behavior by athlete-agents but also protection to
student-athletes and universities.
At the same time, the NCAA, in response to the scandal, revised its
longstanding rules to permit select men’s basketball student-athletes to not only
hire agents but allow them to provide benefits to these student-athletes and their
family members. While the NCAA maintains that it supports the UAAA, it
disregarded it when revising its rules pertaining to athlete-agents. As a result,
NCAA rules on athlete-agents in men’s basketball no longer align with state
athlete-agent laws, the UAAA, and the RUAAA. If drafters of these laws and
acts wish to maintain conformity with NCAA legislation, they must revise the
laws and acts to take into account the recent changes to NCAA legislation.

255. Going Pro, supra note 10 (noting that NCAA has not determined deadline for agent certification,
but the deadline will not be later than August 1, 2020).
256. RUAAA, supra note 110, at 15-18.

